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The defeat of Apartheid in 1994 liberated not only South Africa’s internal political
processes but also its economic relations with neighbouring countries in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). A key outcome was the surge of South
African capital northward after years of dampened large scale investment because of
legal sanction and more informal regulation. By the early 2000s, SouthAfrican mining
and industrial corporations, financial institutions and even some medium-sized
enterprises have once again asserted their role as a dominant force in the SADC region.
South Africa’s economic expansion is sometimes portrayed as a one-way process,
where local environments and communities are passive recipients of SouthAfrican-led
interventions. But evidence increasingly suggests that penetration of the region is
highly contested by host countries, and sometimes actively and effectively resisted at
local level. In other words, elements of both ‘sub-imperialism’ local subversion
are at play.
The region’s foundational economic structures have been reshaped by South
African-led regional economic ‘integration’ against the backdrop of globalisation,
neoliberal reforms and the local policy rendering of the Washington Consensus, the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Yet the precise direction and
implications of this process remain unclear for South Africa, the investment-receiving
countries and the economic coherence of the SADC bloc as a whole.
In this context, the prevailing depiction of South African domination over African
countries who are host to South African corporate expansion by the powerhouses of
Gauteng (the industrial and financial heartland of South Africa) does not always
capture the diversity of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) experiences nor the lessons
for strategic challenges which flow from them. From protests over flawed
privatisations in Tanzania, to the defensive posturing of ruling party ‘indigenisation’
policies in Zimbabwe, to consumer and local producer resistance to the imposition of
South African commodities on regional markets, communities, workers, businesses
and government officials in host countries are developing responses to discipline
incoming capital and challenge SouthAfrican corporates around issues of local benefit
and accountability.
The success and extent of these efforts vary widely and reflect the diverse
configuration of power and weakness in class politics in the region. In all cases, the
contradictory impact of new capital flows is clear, as is the impetus within host
countries to respond to the changing terrain. The growing presence of China as a trade
and investment partner in Africa, and the rapidly diminishing credibility of neoliberal
economic policies are changing the scope of the politics of the possible’ in Southern
Africa. Understanding how internal class contestations in African countries that are
and
host to foreign investors is crucial for an analysis of how both SouthAfrican companies
and regional relations more generally are being reconfigured by local challenges and
responses.
A potent mix of factors led to the explosive growth of northward investment after
1994. While the end of apartheid political and economic isolation brought down
important barriers to capital flows, higher home production costs and stagnant profit
margins in a saturated domestic market provided incentives for producers and traders
to move across borders. The neoliberalised and deregulated consumer and labour
markets found in SADC, though smaller in size and diversity than their South African
counterpart, offered the promise of lower competition and higher returns – ranging
from 30-60 percent said some reports, compared to typical South African rates of 14-
20 percent. Marginal production costs founded on appalling wage and benefits
packages were also a strong pull factor. In the regional agricultural sector, for example,
sugar producing companies like Illovo and Tongaat Hulett identified low-cost
production opportunities and moved rapidly to clinch privatisation deals.
Foreign currency and follow-on investment also emerged as important factors.
Regional profits could be realised in foreign currency, and flexible repatriation
conditions often meant these could be retained outside South Africa. For retailers and
service providers, this presented the opportunity of transforming substantial South
African Rand-denominated production costs into US dollar income, at healthy profit
rates, while retaining flexibility over the investment parking of that income.According
to some observers in the region, it also enabled South African business to flog
uncompetitive, poor quality or otherwise surplus goods and services in regional
markets at unrealistically high prices, to the detriment of regional consumers.
At the same time, the introduction of lease-hire schemes into poorer urban and peri-
urban areas across the region wrenched open new and profitable markets for low-end
consumer goods. Here, highly skewed regional consumer credit schemes, in tandem
with high inventories of devalued goods in South Africa, were key. Lusaka, seen by
many South African businesses as a typical regional city, became a testing ground of
sorts: the first new big South African-modelled malls, retail chains, food and
entertainment franchises were established there, and their performance was monitored
closely and used to extrapolate operational models for elsewhere.
Regional governments also played a role in creating space for the South African
invasion. Pressured by the World Bank, IMF, donors and, increasingly, by a
neoliberalising South African state, SADC governments led restructuring in the form
of privatisation, reformed investment regulations and finance markets. They opened
new large terrains to private sector speculation that had previously been closed by
parastatal-dominated monopolies. Opportunities emerged in areas such as mining,
banking and insurance, telecommunications, agriculture and dairy, transport
(railways, airlines and ports), and utilities.
The South African government also directly facilitated capital outflows to the
region. In March 1997 it initiated the relaxation of exchange controls for investments
into the region and further offshore, with preferential terms given for the former.
Regional investment limits were increased in subsequent years as other financial
restrictions and tax disincentives were diminished. By 2004, SouthAfrican firms were
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allowed to invest up to R2 billion in Africa (half that for outside Africa),
dramatically up from a lowly R50 million in 1997.
The ANC government was clearly responding to a shifting reality on the ground
encountered by its own transnational corporations: a significant number of South
African transnationals were becoming increasingly dependent on offshore assets and
income for their overall viability. By 2002, mining house AngloGold Ashanti and
telecommunications player MTN each derived more than half of their group worth
from their African activities. Other companies showed similar levels of exposure to –
and gain from – the region.
Meanwhile, a regional peace dividend also surfaced in the business sector. This
was especially important for mining, where the cessation of conflict in Mozambique
and Namibia enabled the launching of exploration using modern techniques. There
was also new and substantial exploration in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe fuelled
by liberalised investment regimes and rising commodity prices. Telecoms, transport
and energy distribution reconstruction also benefited.
Although South African capital has been active in neighbouring countries since the
first scramble forAfrica in the late 1800s, its offshore investment since the transition to
majority rule reflects a number of critically new features. Even as the bulk of South
African offshore FDI has drifted away from Africa towards developed countries – in
2005 the EU took 76 percent of SouthAfrica’s outgoing FDI,Africa only 8.8 percent –
the market share of SouthAfrican FDI intoAfrica has risen, with the sector and country
spread of new investments expanding rapidly. The significance of recent intra-regional
FDI for host countries is underlined by the relative scarcity of new or follow-on FDI
overall. While there is emerging evidence that Asian and, to a lesser extent European
and US investors, are developing an interest in African non-petroleum resources, new
FDI expressions of interest remain limited to a few sectors. It is likely that South
African investments will continue to count among the largest in the region for the
medium term.
By the late 1990s SouthAfrica had emerged as the dominant source of the SADC’s
FDI, overtaking established leaders Germany, the UK, US and Japan.According to the
BusinessMap Foundation, an independent investment tracking think tank, 25 percent
of all dollar-denominated FDI into SADC in the decade after 1994 came from South
Africa, reaching nearly 40 percent in some years. Over this period South Africans
became the top ranking foreign investors in seven neighbouring countries.At the same
time, South African companies pressed further north, sometimes using SADC as a
regional platform for expansion. In the late 1990s the number of companies operating
offshore in Africa doubled. This invasion was spearheaded by larger companies:
according to one survey, 34 of the top companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange made 232 investments in 27 African countries in the first decade after
apartheid.
South African private investors were joined by public companies and government-
controlled development agencies, and soon consolidated a significant presence
continent-wide in a range of key industrial, financial, agricultural and services sectors.
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the whole of the continent, anchored by neighbourhood operations that continued to
absorb 80 percent of the country’s offshore African investments. Loan finance and
portfolio (stock market) investment into the region also rose.
In SADC, SouthAfrican companies moved steadily beyond traditional sectors like
mining and minerals processing. While the latter still accounted for the largest overall
investments, there was significant new FDI into banking, telecoms, retail, tourism and
other areas.
The major South African banks each opened or substantially expanded operations
in the region, partly in response to the extended cross border activities of larger South
African corporates, and typically in competition with established international
regional players Barclays and Standard Chartered. By the early 2000s most SADC
countries were host to at least one South African retailing or merchant bank, and
follow-on investments were in progress.
Telecoms FDI into the region was even more explosive, fuelled by rapid sector
deregulation, woefully inadequate fixed line infrastructures, very high unmet demand
and ease of installation.Amassive regional investment programme led by junior South
African player MTN was followed by local market competitor Vodacom. Strategic
partnerships with international and regional players saw South African telecom
companies spread their operating footprint as far as the huge and lucrative West
African market and beyond into the Middle East. By 2006, telecoms surged
temporarily into the lead position among South African FDI into the continent,
reaching about R17 billion overall, on the back of continuing consumer demand and
comparatively high rates of profit from non-SouthAfrican sources.
Retail and tourism brands – from supermarkets and clothing stores; to electronic
goods distributors, cinema complexes and fast food franchises; to hotel chains, safari
companies and airlines – have increasingly served as icons of South African business
expansion on the ground in SADC. While their widespread presence is not matched by
their overall FDI dollar value, their market significance and impact have been
profound. New retail and tourist ventures have often displaced (and sometimes
absorbed) the activities of local market players, while providing vertically structured
commodity chains for South African producers in the region. The upmarket
Woolworths franchise represented one example of this combined effect: its local
franchisees paid in foreign currency for licensing rights and standard branding
fixtures, and were compelled to purchase the bulk of retail stock directly from
Woolworth’s South African inventory catalogue. In this way risk was transferred into
the region and SouthAfrican supply chains were privileged.
Multi-country investments in several sectors afforded transnationals a competitive
edge in single country markets, in terms not only of production and marketing
economies of scale but also of brand recognition, transportability of clients and intra-
firm management of assets. For example, the South African transnationals could boast
a scope and reach of services beyond the reach of single-country players in the
coordination of mobile phone network connectivity, cross-border banking access or
inter-country transferable insurance schemes. Standard Bank’s local presence in 17
African countries, including 10 SADC neighbours, provided clear advantages that
were replicated by many other firms.
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Trade imbalances between SouthAfrica and the region also helped consolidate this
competitive advantage. This imbalance was 9:1 in South Africa’s favour by the early
2000s (and 5:1 withAfrica overall). This skewed trade pattern was strengthened by the
regional expansion of vertically-integrated South African retailing chains that
competed directly with local retailers and producers. Shoprite, for example, reportedly
contributed R2 billion to SouthAfrican exports by the early 2000s through its sourcing
of retail inputs from its home base.
In some instances, such as the Mozal aluminium plant outside Maputo,
Mozambique, it is likely that increased FDI helped to deepen the existing trade
imbalance by fuelling higher levels of capital and consumable imports needed to
service the new investment.
With the settling-in of new FDI in the late 1990s, new questions surfaced about its
longer term impact on local economic sovereignty and business development. Many
saw recent investments as predatory, displacing existing local enterprises and
production through a mix of aggressive and unfair intra-firm trade, pressurized merger
and acquisition bids, politically-leveraged access to large scale privatisations and
cheap financing from South Africa, and skills poaching. The unemployment effects,
service disruptions and costs, national revenue shortfalls and diminished local
accountability of FDI operators became glaringly apparent, and the subject of
increasing public scrutiny.
In South Africa and SADC there is wide-ranging debate among government,
business, labour and local communities about the aims, benefits and long term
implications of the changing patterns of regional investment. There is similar diversity
in the kinds of practical local level responses to that FDI which has taken root. Both are
changing the context and to some extent the terms, of South Africa’s evolving
economic relationship with the region.
One view situates South African FDI within the broader dynamics of neoliberal
globalisation, and sees the northward push by Pretoria and SouthAfrican capital as part
of the recolonisation of SADC and the continent by western dominated interests.
Here, South Africa acts as an active proxy for international capital, multilateral
financial institutions and governments, helping to soften legal and political resistance
to foreign capital, and open up access to extractive resources, business and consumer
markets. The ANC government’s championing of NEPAD, its own trade pact with the
EU and growing role within multilateral institutions, alongside its skewed bilateral
trade and investment deals with neighbouring states, for example, are cited as evidence
of a new sub-imperialism, orchestrated from Pretoria for the benefit of South African
and international capital.
In this view, new FDI is seen mostly as negative: parasitic, opportunistic,
displacing of local capacity and employment, and resulting in profits going to South
Africa or overseas, rather than to host country markets. And the ‘African Renaissance’
– heralded by the ANC government in the late 1990s and enthusiastically endorsed by
northward-looking South African corporations – becomes an ideological excuse for
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Others portray northward FDI in less negative, although not unambiguously
positive, terms for both sides of the border. They cite the relative neglect of African
consumer and services markets by non-African FDI, the perilous state of capital-
starved regional infrastructure, and the benefits of investments that are more exposed
to regional consumer, economic and political leverage due to their local regional roots.
The shared conclusion is that growing interdependence, however uneven, among key
southern African regional economies is likely, even if the political implications for
regional integration are less certain.
But parallel to these debates, local businesses, labour, communities and policy
makers are developing new ways of dealing with – and ‘disciplining’ – incoming
capital. While the power of new FDI in the region is displayed in national accounts,
diminished workforces and in the changing street-level profile of commercial districts,
malls and products, the residual power of host country interests is also increasingly
evident. The unilateral power of intra-regional FDI is being challenged, raising
important questions about the potential for and future shape of SADC as an integrated
economic region. Witness Zambia: it was among the first countries in the region to
decisively (if disastrously) implement neoliberal reforms leading to large scale
privatisations in which South African firms featured prominently. But it has also been
an incubator for multiple forms of resistance aimed at changing the terms of local
engagement with FDI, and challenging, more broadly, neoliberalism's established
models of local development.
Privatisation began in earnest in Zambia in the mid 1990s, with key components of the
parastatals sector put on the block for sale. In all, more than 250 enterprises
representing more than 85 percent of the Zambian economy were sold. These included
not only the state-run mining sector, but also agricultural operations, transport and
electricity grids, national retail chains, banks, hotels and game parks. South African
investors would play a central role in the bidding, amid widespread allegations of
corruption and bribery, insider trading and mounting pressure for a quickening of sales
by the IMF, World Bank and other donors.
The profoundly negative impacts of privatisation soon followed: spiralling
unemployment and reduced security of employment, asset stripping, declining
production, and increasingly secretive policy making and implementation by
government.
The disaggregation and subsequent sale of the massive state-owned Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) was the centrepiece of government’s
privatisation programme in the late 1990s. However, it was not long before protests
from local communities surfaced around the terms of sale, including the shedding of
social assets and responsibilities like pension benefits, housing, health care and
schools by the new mine owners. While this kind of resistance was repressed,
sometimes violently, by the state, a new culture of civic resistance and demands for
accountability slowly took root.
Today, there is widespread popular debate in the civic movement, trade unions and
political parties about the consequences of the 1990s neoliberal reforms and the
mistakes associated with privatisation. There have also been practically-oriented
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forms of resistance that have resulted in creeping concessions from foreign investors to
Zambian businesses, workers and communities. The privatisation of the national
grocery chain and its takeover by South Africa’s Shoprite is one such example;
Zambia’s privatised dairy sector, in which the new South African owners came under
pressure to demonstrate local responsibility and ‘embeddedness’, is another example,
both of which will be examined in more detail in the articles of this series.
While Zambia’s recent experience of FDI has been characterized by the familiar
negative features of diminished control and unfulfilled expectations, current popular
and business responses, and increasingly, political party ones as well, reflect a concern
with finding strategic ways forward. In particular, there is growing recognition of the
vulnerability of foreign enterprises to local business, consumer and political pressure.
There are strains of resurgent nationalist, anti-globalisation sentiments in all this,
replete with political energy as well as alternatives that are perhaps too-narrowly
focused. But it is also clear that there has been no easy sealing of any sub-imperial
compact in the post-privatisation era.
It seems appropriate to reflect on the nature of the post-Apartheid Southern African
region, and we pause to make a theoretical digression at this point. We start with a brief
summary of our discussion so far. Drawing on an article published by Miller (2004) in
an earlier issue of the the contention here is that post-
Apartheid Southern Africa is opening up within Africa. South
Africa’s democratisation has opened up a new era for the Southern African region. As
the region’s economic powerhouse, South Africa has asserted its regional political
leadership, immediately assuming a major role in the SADC and the African Union
(AU), key institutions for regional economic and political collaboration. At the same
time, SouthAfrica’s huge conglomerates have initiated a new round of investment that
extends beyond their traditional sectors and trading partners into areas north of Sub-
SaharanAfrica, including some of the largest direct foreign investment into the region.
The international prestige attached to South Africa’s transition has conferred a new
respectability on the region’s policies and projects. What follows analyses this
territorial expansion of South African capital into Southern Africa in the post-
Apartheid period and the role of We attempt in the discussion to foreground the role of
this capital in integrating the SouthernAfrican region.
Critiquing the narrow conceptual framework of regional integration, this paper
attempts to foreground the role of multinational corporations as agents of regional
integration. Regionalism entails social contestations over how capital accumulation
proceeds in Southern Africa, both in terms of capital’s material practices and its styles
of representation. Regional integration framework located within the International
Relations perspective focuses on the role of states in making geographic regions
cohere or fragment. Spatialised notions of geographic regions privilege a variety of
social actors in regional formation. This approach draws on concepts developed in
human geography that see physical space as socially contested, where regions are
implicated in a ‘politics of scale’, with different social classes making claims on the
post-Apartheid region. Capital accumulation in post-Apartheid Southern Africa is not
a disembodied process of foreign direct investment represented in technical terms.
Post-Apartheid SouthernAfrica as a new regional space
African Sociological Review,
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These flows of capital have consequences for how class politics works in this new
regional space. The prevailing emphasis on regional integration is part of a global
resurgence of regionalism in the 1980s. Coinciding with a neoliberal emphasis within
globalisation, regionalism was tied to the goals of attracting foreign direct investment.
Meanings attached to regionalism bear the mark of global power. The
supranational region today is imagined as a global gateway – an entry-point – to the
‘information highway’. The inward protectionism of earlier regionalisms was
superseded by the ‘port of entry’ vision (Omae, 1995). What we imagine to be
politically possible for regions reflects such dominant discourses about globalisation
in which the goal of regional integration is the creation of regional havens for capital.
Such supra-national regions are envisaged as prisms for capturing capital. If a nation
aligns itself with other countries, it has a better chance of being an economic winner,
rather than a loser, stepping up the global hierarchy of nation-states (Oman, C., 1994).
Through regionalism it is hoped that global competitive advantages will be enhanced
(Storper, 1997: 4). The geographic region thus became a further strategy for global
inclusion; an additional lever in the quest for global competitiveness.
While regions have had different hegemonic and counter-hegemonic meanings
over time and space, Eurocentric concerns of regional integration in the European
Union have cast a long shadow over perceptions of a new regional order today.
Looking over their shoulders at the consolidation of regional power-blocs in the global
order, less developed countries have been scrambling to form or revive regional
institutions such as SADC and MERCOSUR, or to seek accommodation within
dominant regional arrangements such as the European Community. Regionalism has
become a catchword for nation-states who act as chief executives of capital. These
states intervened with large amounts of money to subsidise all new private capital
projects; opened up new sites of investment through privatisation; cut loose
protectionist exchange controls over national currencies and industrial sectors. The
disenchantment with the political capacity of the nation-state and the global turn
towards regionalism as a geographic lever in global competition is echoed in the advice
of the Frelimo ex-Minister of Information turned Investment Advisor that ‘the true
future of the world is not Globalisation. The future of the world is regionalisation. With
Frelimo we put all our faith in the nation-state. We have reached the end of the nation-
state’. (Interview, Investment Advisor and ex-Frelimo Minister of Information,
Maputo,August 1999).
Critiquing the statist emphasis of regional integration, this emphasis on ‘society-
centred regionalism’ advances an alternative conceptual framework for regionalist
analyses. The argument is that geographic spaces embody dynamic social relations
that are contested by a variety of social agents. This approach insists that geographic
spaces are social in nature and are formed through political contestations of competing
social classes. While nation-states are key actors in these social contestations, regional
formation and regional integration are by no means reducible to the actions of nation-
states. Space is a contested terrain in the manufacture of consent. In a novel application
of the French geographer Lefebvre, Niemann (2001) seeks to free Southern African
regionalist analyses of the Eurocentric precepts of regional integration theory.
Conceptualising regions as socio-spatial entities that transcend the static, statist
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assumptions of traditional International Relations (IR), he argues that supra-national
regions are spaces that embody more than physical distances to be overcome.
It is our purpose in this article to challenge this discourse and, instead call for a
radically open dialogue about regionalization and the meaning of regions with a
specific focus on SouthernAfrica (Niemann, 2001: 59).
The consequence of state-centred analysis for regions is three-fold, argues
Niemann (ibid.). It marginalises other non-state actors and gives the state a monopoly
on relations between countries. It places emphasis on the state’s role in shaping
conflict or making contracts and it focuses on how states are integrated by means of
free trade areas, customs unions and policy coordination. This analysis of the state
excludes the spatial dimension of power relations.
Applying his revision of International Relations theory, Niemann (2001: 67-72)
provides a historical account of the production of spaces in Southern Africa since the
1800s and shows how a perception of the region as a coherent entity emerges through
particular spatial practices. Out of a physical landmass at the southern tip of theAfrican
continent, a notion of a coherent geographic entity, a social space, emerges over time
that is intimately tied into the contests for economic control. Race formed one crucial
demarcation in representational spaces of the region, with a corresponding set of
segregated spaces of representation.
Spaces were identified by the skin colour of those who were permitted to live
through them. It was possible to read off the body of an individual whether or not that
individual was in the proper space and the pass laws in South Africa, the housing of
labour in hostels and compounds adjacent to mines and, later, manufacturing facilities
all reflected this racialization of space in southernAfrica (Niemann, 2001: 74).
The bounded national entities that dominate the regional space are contradicted by
the spatial flows of commodities, people and labour that create mutual dependency
amongst the different societies within Southern Africa. There is a porosity in the
borders of the region’s countries that overflows the boundaries of nation-states and
creates a societal level of interaction. In this sense, the region is also a ‘counterspace’ to
inter-state relations.
We can therefore imagine regions not only as spatial constructs which facilitate the
exploitation of the subcontinent; we can also imagine them as counter-spaces, as sites
of resistance to such processes. One such imagination is to think of
(our italics) rather than spaces of flows or spaces of places. A region so
conceptualized constitutes an integrated space not because of trade flows or
institutional apparatuses but because its inhabitants share a commitment to struggle for
the same enforceable protections against abuses be they committed by states or
corporations. To conceive of regions as spaces of rights represents a direct challenge to
the hegemonic consensus of liberalism. Such efforts transcend the traditional spatial
organization by insisting that rights of persons be recognized outside and independent
of the national state. They reject the position of the state as the sole arbiter of the rights
of ‘its’ citizens and therefore create new spaces of reference (Niemann, ibid: 75).
Contesting rights has a regional dimension that is shaped by the way space is
produced and represented in the region. This entails a social process that is much wider
than the purview of state foreign policy or regional practices. Niemann’s discussion
thus prises open narrow interpretations of regionalism to ‘make space’ for social actors
16
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beyond their position as national citizens. While Niemann’s revision represents a
critical widening of the debate on regionalism, understanding the region as a ‘space of
rights’ both opens up and closes down different possibilities for understanding
regionalism. On the one hand, it opens up regions as social spaces that may be
contested. The role of civil society as a competing regional agent and a central force for
alternative regionalisms is illuminated in his discussion. Hidden dimensions of
regional working class formation and the racialised contours of Southern Africa that
evolve out of its systems of wage labour are elaborated historically. On the other hand,
he locates this discussion back within liberal theory and the framework of ‘rights’. This
political emphasis keeps the social dimensions of regional identities and perceptions
opaque. The relational processes that shape regional integration still require
elucidation.
Seeing regions as ‘spaces of rights’, however, ignores the spatial and scalar
problems that regionalisation poses for regional identities against particularistic
identities. Xenophobia, for example, may be analysed as a desperate clinging to place
and locality in the face of destabilising regional and global forces. Such particularistic
or place-bound identities contrast with and oppose the regional and pan-African
universal claims of the project. Attachments to place and
localities or sub-regional identities can become stronger as spatial barriers crumble
and local areas are subjected to global forces in a more direct way. While global forces
seem out of reach and more difficult to control, communities attach more vociferously
to local places (Harvey, 1996). Extending the discussion of ‘rights’ to the spatial claims
of different social classes allows for a more expansive discussion of regionalism in
SouthernAfrica.
To expand Niemann’s (op. cit.) discussion, we represent the region as a ‘space of
claims’. In the same way that globalisation is a ‘societal construct’ (Keet, 1999),
regionalism and the formation of regions is a social process, entailing institutional
power, a shared geographic identity, regional labour markets and always relentlessly
driven by capitalist accumulation and framed by the power and command of money.
Power relations are also spatialised. Who is to be integrated, how and on what basis is
not simply a question of contractual regional arrangements but a question of the spatial
‘geometries of power’ (Massey, 1992). Space is produced through the constant
‘reworking of the geographies of capital circulation and accumulation’ (Swyngedouw,
2000). These changes in the spatial configurations are accompanied by changes in the
scales of governance. A group of nation-states, sometimes geographically contiguous
but not always, combines to form a particular geometry of power. Multilateral
agreements are not simply an arithmetic agglomeration of inter-state arrangements. If
South Africa is the dominant power in the region, then any regional integration
arrangement will reflect this uneven geometry of regional power.
Powers of inclusion, exclusion and disciplinary power will cohere in any formal
regional arrangement, irrespective of how egalitarian the terms of such an agreement
might be. As social power relations reconfigure, these changes produce new meanings
about a specific geographic scale, marginalising some while thrusting others onto
centre stage.
Most importantly, however, these scale redefinitions alter and express changes in
the geometry of social power by strengthening the power and control of some while
African Renaissance
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disempowering others (Swyngedouw, in Cox, 1997: 142).
Workers in Southern Africa, for example, are devalued socially as a regional ‘cost’
rather than a regional ‘benefit’, while those engaged in regional trade and investment
are eminently respectable regional agents (Mhone, 1997). Forums for discussing
future regional arrangements will thus reflect the social dominance of the regional
‘insiders’. What is significant here is not that social inclusion and exclusion processes
happen, but that these processes take spatial forms.
A new meaning is given to a particular social scale – the nation, the region, the
global system – in line with shifts in power relations. Regions, then, are more than
physical demarcations. They entail a social claim to a geographic space between the
scale of the nation-state and the global system. Against the Euclidian notion of ‘space-
as-container’ or space as fixed, regions are dynamic entities, not just static groups of
contiguous states. Social space according to Lefebvre’s conceptual ‘triad’ is
constituted by ‘the perceived, the conceived, and the lived’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 39). The
foreign investment of SouthAfrican companies in post-Apartheid SouthernAfrica can
be understood as a claim on the region. Capital’s ability to command power over space
and social relations is a central dimension in the way that the region is integrated, how
regional power is accumulated and which regional forces are marginalised. We now
turn to the regional role of SouthAfrican multinationals.
South African capital has established a strong claim to the regional space of
SouthernAfrica, both in the present and in the past. The historical geography of capital
accumulation in Southern Africa has placed South African capital, through its
multinational corporations, at the centre of regional accumulation processes. South
African-based or South African multinational corporations have played a central role
in constituting Southern Africa as a regional entity. Much of the capital flows through
or from South Africa allowed part of the regional surplus to fuel South Africa’s
economic development. Regional development has in many instances implied South
African development in the region’s past. The regional omnipresence of South Africa
as well as the integrating role of its multinational corporations is an important feature
of post-Apartheid Southern Africa. South African (or South African-based) capital
historically, through the agency of the multinational firm, has integrated the countries
of Southern Africa in an uneven way. South Africa’s ability to command capital and
labour flows in the region through these powerful multinational corporations
accelerated South Africa’s economic growth, creating tremendous regional
unevenness.
While invoking notions of justice, the geographic moment of spatial claims goes
beyond a liberal sense of rights. Unlike the abstract universalism of rights discourses,
such claims assert a definite geographic moment that give definition to the strategic
political choices that competing classes elect to make at any given moment.
This special issue of the derives from a research project
that aimed to conduct a deeper theoretical and empirical analysis of South African
investment in Africa in the post-Apartheid period. The articles in this special issue
were the product of fieldwork conducted by a multi-disciplinary, international research
team. Based at Rhodes University and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC),
Empirical Case Studies
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the research project examined the expansion of South African corporates in the post-
Apartheid period, comparing a range of countries and sectors. The project challenged
the notion of host countries as passive recipients of South African economic
intervention. The project was supported with funding from CODESRIA, Rhodes
University, HSRC and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.
We sought to understand how internal class contestations shape the way that South
African companies conduct their activities in foreign African locales. The project was
based on the following hypothesis: Dynamic internal contestations shape the terms of
the engagement between South African investment and the African host
countries/economies. Each case study thus aimed to gather more information on the
host terrain and key social classes, as well as how they positioned themselves in
relation to the new South African investment. The significance of these effects was
discussed in relation to the regional perceptions produced by these engagements, and
the relationship between perceptions and practice for post-Apartheid regionalism in
SouthernAfrica.Abrief outline of the chapters in this special issue is provided below.
Like other countries in the Southern African Development Community, Tanzania
implemented a programme of economic reforms in the last decade that was aimed at
attracting foreign investors. Subsequent developments in response to the country’s
liberalisation demonstrate trends that are discernible throughout the Southern African
region. A deluge of South African investors took advantage of the privatisation and
liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy, leading to a ‘protracted and painful national
debate’ about the role of foreign investors in Tanzania, particularly the new South
African presence. Beginning with an overview of the historical geography of relations
between South Africa and Tanzania, Schroeder argues that South Africa has been one
important factor in the shaping of Tanzanian national identity, firstly as an opposition
to the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and then through the state’s attempt to
rehabilitate South Africa’s image under the post-apartheid regime. With the deluge of
South African investment, the recent perception amongst Tanzanians, contends
Schroeder, is that ‘SouthAfricans have taken over everything of value in the Tanzanian
economy’.
While the state tries to downplay South African dominance, the negative impact of
retrenchments after South African take-overs, the loss of livelihood to small scale
gemstone miners, the diminishing of Tanzanian cultural symbols in favour of the
assertion of South African branding and a range of controversial actions by South
African firms have deepened negative perceptions of South Africa in Tanzania. While
some in the Tanzanian business community welcome the South African investors as
superior and competitive enterprises, the ‘perceived loss of national assets’ counters
this sentiment with the contention that South Africans have benefited from the earlier
developmental efforts of the Tanzanian state. This perception is especially pronounced
amongst older Tanzanians who lived under the Nyerere government. Economic profits
from South African investment in Tanzania do not accrue to Tanzania, and the
country’s infrastructure remains in a state of disrepair. These negative perceptions are
deepened by the perceived racialistic practices of South Africans and their
corporations.
Miller, Nel and Hampwaye argue that the conventional thinking on SouthAfrica in
Africa, which implies an overwhelming dominance or hegemonic role of SouthAfrica,
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is flawed. This, according to the authors, is because the region’s ‘geographies speak of
a region integrated since colonial times; of people who, for a long time, traversed the
region with labour and goods even when Independence initiatives marked the regional
territories in the SADCC. New traders follow old traders. SouthAfrica andAfrica have
inter-dependent historical geographies that shaped the region then and now’. While
South Africa is indeed a hegemonic power in the region and Africa more broadly, this
perspective presents the region as a ‘tabula rasa’, with no sense of the internal class
contestations that shape and reshape the SouthAfrican presence in host countries.
What is particularly significant in their study of the retail sector in Zambia is that
the generally-held view that South African firms are juggernauts that roll over local
business is only partially true. They concede that while the expansion of SouthAfrican
retail corporations has been dominant in the region since well over a decade, local
investments mimicking South African firms also show their muscle. They provide
evidence of this in the retail sector in which such a big SouthAfrican retailer, Shoprite,
is emulated by smaller Zambian retailers who have also opened up shopping malls in
Lusaka. Not only are local retailers putting up a challenge to South African retailers,
the expansion of Shoprite has also been confronted with resistance from workers,
farmers and even their own SouthAfrican shareholders.
In fleshing this point out, the authors explore the complex relationship between
race and multinational expansion in the region. The key point is that urban trading
patterns in Southern Africa spread in a racially uneven way, dividing black African
consumers and businessmen in mining towns and townships or ‘locations’ from white
European traders and consumers in central business districts. The common element in
the development of the retail sector is the colonial pattern of indigenous exclusion.
During the colonial period, they note, credit extended more easily from the metropole
to the European entrepreneur. With a racial municipal legislation, white-run businesses
dominated the formal retail market in many African cities. The dominance manifested
itself in the central business district (CBD), which expanded as settler cities grew.
African businessmen were prohibited from the CBD by municipal legislation. The
expansion of retailing in Africa, they argue, thus followed the racialised contours of
colonial economic development. The authors illustrate this argument by looking at
retailing in Zambia.
Shopping malls, they show, are a phenomenon of the liberalisation of the economy
in Zambia. Based primarily in the capital of Lusaka, these malls are clones of South
African malls. With few or no restrictions on foreign companies, the incentives for
foreign investors were significant, which SouthAfrican retailers have used to their full
advantage. When Shoprite tried to sell its assets to a private equity fund, both workers
and shareholders successfully resisted this restructuring. Similarly, the attempt at an
economic supply arrangement between Shoprite and local producers in Chipata was
not something the company actively sought out but evidence of its vulnerability to
local resistance. What the authors conclude from their study is that ‘South Africa in
Africa’ is more about ‘South Africa and Africa’. The current framework of analysis
needs to be revised in favour of a more historically accurate, relational understanding
of the region. Regional analyses need to be informed by an understanding of how
various social classes at the national level reshape regional relations and contest South
African hegemony.
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Kenny and Mather locate their study within the sub-imperialism ‘debate’. The
main organising question of their study was stated simply: ‘How are we to understand
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by South African Companies in Zambia’s dairy
chain?’ The answer that this question begs, they point out, is that South African capital
is engaged in a deepening process of ‘sub-imperialism’ in the region. They took issue
with this approach, arguing that an examination of the Zambian diary sector in which
SouthAfrican companies have large investment, reveals otherwise. They noted that the
dairy sector in Zambia is now healthier than it was between 1970s and mid-1990s when
neo-colonialism impacted negatively on the economies of most African countries. In
the dairy sector, government-owned dairy processing units were sold off as a
consequence of privatisation. The two bidders were South African companies: Clover
and Bonnita, which was later bought by Parmalat, an Italian, South African-based
multinational firm. What would seem implicit in their argument is that Parmalat, other
private processors and non-governmental organisations provided the condition for the
sector’s revival because of their support for small-scale farmers. Indeed, the brief
history of the industry they provide shows that ‘turn-around’ in the industry started
with privatisation.
However, foreign investors were not able to take a strong hold of the sector because
of the power of the Zambian Dairy Association which was successful in its actions to
limit dairy imports (suggesting some degree of protectionism in the industry). Related
to this is the fact of the nature of the industry with its two sectors: the fresh milk
products (milk and yoghurt) and the processed products (butter and cheese). Larger
processors are involved in both, whereas smaller ones are focused on fresh products –
understandably produced with inexpensive technology. For the processors, the global
shortage and high price of powdered milk means they have to source locally to
produce. The prevailing presence of local producers in the Zambian dairy industry
challenges the notion of the sub-imperial South African juggernaut in the region, a
point further buttressed by the authors who show that South African capital and
imports are not the only external factors shaping the industry because they are not the
only foreign suppliers. Kenyan and Irish firms play a significant role in the industry
too.
Saunders’s study of the Zimbabwean mining industry reveals the political
character of South African investment in the industry. He points to the South African
government’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Robert Mugabe as part of an economically
enabling political strategy. Saunders sees South Africa's approach to Zimbabwe as ‘an
important component of a co-ordinated strategy aimed at enabling political hegemony
and economic occupation’. However, in general, foreign investment in Zimbabwe is
complex and affected by ‘short-term crises and attendant market opportunities, and
long term dynamics of state institutional decay, policy weakness and political
vulnerability’. Saunders points out that, despite being an industry imbued with proven
valuable resources of valuable commodities, capacity in infrastructure and
comparatively good mining skills, significant growth in mining production has not
occurred. In Saunders’s view, the Zimbabwean government is to be held accountable
because it nurtured chaos. ‘Its apparent toleration if not involvement in massive
corruption and its inability to provide predictable political and regulatory leadership,
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only raised new questions around the role of the State and ruling party in the
exploitation of national resources for public benefit.’
Saunders presents the chaos nurtured by the government in his history of the
mining sector starting from the golden 1990s when there was considerable foreign
investment in the sector because of the well-maintained infrastructure, skilled
workforce and professionally-managed state regulatory institutions. The economic
policy shift informed by the IMF-imposed structural adjustment created a climate for
new mining investors and helped transfer a growing proportion of national income
from working and rural communities to the strengthened business elite. South African
mining firms were unperturbed by the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe. In
fact, as Saunders states, they led the way in restructuring ownership in the large and
medium scale mining sector.
As trade increases, so does the mobility of goods, people and information.
Consequently, the intertwined processes of globalisation, the emergence of global
production networks and new corporate strategies articulate a specific demand for
appropriate infrastructure. The response to this has been to concentrate sufficient
infrastructure in locations that are directly part of the flow. Consequently, large scale
infrastructure policy at the transnational and metropolitan levels is often committed to
provide and expand capacity in major nodes within the wider Global Production
Networks (GPN) such as seaports and border towns with trading-hubs. Yet, such
measures are increasingly limited because they involve considerable expense and
occur in a contested political environment. It is within this context that Roodt’s study
of the state-led investment in the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) of the Maputo
Development Corridor Maputo corridor becomes significant. He suggests that the
initiative acted as a conduit in facilitating cross-border flows and created a dynamic set
of social processes within Nelspruit in South Africa and Maputo in Mozambique and
the respective provinces in which both cities are.
Roodt points out that the SDI between the Mozambican and South African
governments emerged from an agreement in 1995 to re-establish the transport axis
between Maputo and Johannesburg as part of ‘an attempt to revitalise southern
Mozambique’. The SDI concept, he adds, grew to encompass a range of targeted
interventions by ‘central governments, initially within South Africa, but soon
extending into the whole of southern and east Africa, with the stated intention of
unlocking economic potential and facilitating private investment and job creation in
localised area or region’. The Maputo Development Corridor, which is his main
concern provided, he argues, the political and economic framework for the flow of
foreign direct investment for South Africa into Mozambique and also new
opportunities for business investment by large South African companies, especially
construction, retail, services and finance. The conventional thinking that, like all such
initiatives, the corridor serves as a catalyst for development, is one difficult to sustain,
Roodt argues. He points to all the difficulties that militate against the corridor and
concludes that it failed to generate local economic development.
As Miller, et al., and Martin (below) show, South Africa is a powerful regional
economy. It attracts foreign investment far more than any other country in the region. It
is thus not unexpected that is serves as a launch pad for multinationals that want to
invest in the region. It is this relationship that concerns Sanchez who presents a case
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study of Ericsson, a Swedish multinational telecommunications firm that has a
substantial operation in South Africa. Sanchez sees the political and economic
developments in South Africa after 1994, and the liberalisation of the mobile phone
market across Africa since 2003, as significant for Ericsson’s expansion from South
Africa into other parts of the continent. Both Saunders and Sanchez highlight the
introduction of legislation to bring black shareholders on board. Ericsson restructured
its operations in South Africa to respond to these challenges. Under ‘the new setup the
regional company – not bound by the same BBBEE (broad-based black economic
empowerment) restrictions – will not invest resources and time complying with South
African requirements that do not provide a direct benefit to other African business’.
While aligning their operations to comply with BBBEE requirements in South Africa,
a parallel strategy is being developed for other African operations where legislation is
absent or weak. SouthAfrica is thus used as a conduit in the operation of multinationals
in the continent, but local South African conditions also impact on the nature of these
firms’African operations.
What is evident in all the case studies is how South African firms are increasingly
making their presence felt inAfrica, an expansion that reinforces SouthAfrica’s role as
one of the fulcra around which political and economic life inAfrica revolve. This point
is taken up by Martin who argues that how these relationships coalesce and what their
future trajectory may be, remain open questions. A salient factor is the ‘radical shift in
the world economic and political order’. His concern is the ‘(1) rise of East-South
relationships over North-South ones, and more specifically the demise of Europe’s and
North America’s domination over Africa and (2) due to growing resistance, the end of
the neo-liberal Thermidor and the emerging search for a stable, post-liberal world’.
SouthAfrica’s position in the continent within the North-South relationship, which has
been seen as sub-imperial, Martin argues, was consciously constructed through state
action in the interwar years.
This is a reiteration of his argument of well over a decade ago. As he posits in the
present issue: ‘Creating centre-hinterland ties across southern Africa was very much a
South African state-led endeavour against open, underdeveloped ties to the regional
colonizer Britain on one hand, and the countervailing creation of underdeveloping
relationships with colonial territories on the other’. Though South Africa is still
committed to the North, a gradual re-orientation to the East is taking place. The degree
of this reorientation is not as great as the reorientation of many African states to the
East. For Martin, there are three long-term possibilities: a ‘Washington-Pretoria’
consensus; the ‘New Bandung Consensus’ and a ‘Peoples’ Consensus’, ‘with the
policies of state and regional organisations being driven by increasingly unruly,
popular discontent’.
In recent years, the unmistakeable decline in the credibility of neoliberal development
models in the Global South has been exacerbated by the growing presence of China
and India as alternative trade and investment partners in Africa. This represents
something of a double-edged sword: while southern alternatives for foreign
development capital are now more readily accessible, it is not clear that they will be
more transparent, accountable and socially responsible than recent waves of FDI; nor
Old models, new environments and emerging questions
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is it certain that their impact on local trade and investment patterns will be any less
disruptive and destabilizing.
Indeed, some suggest that the growth of Chinese trade and investment involvement
in the region’s resource and industrial sectors could profoundly undermine the fragile
coherence established under the current domination of SouthAfrica, without putting in
place a regionally-grounded alternative. Beyond the extractive sectors and basic
processing, the fear is that there will be little regional FDI under a future trade-
dominated economic regime.
All the more reason, then, to pay close attention to the experiences and positions
emerging from production places, labour markets and communities of the region, as
they seek to redefine the rights and limits of foreign investment on new terms.
for
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